

3 November 1960

Suggestions for DCI Speech

1. The rough outline seems satisfactory for a general survey of US-Soviet relations.

2. Probably the first decade is the most difficult to characterize. "Confusion" is perhaps the best term to cover the mixture of American attitudes toward the Soviet regime during these early years. Never since the period of the French Revolution had Americans observed a great country experiencing the effects of a fundamental social revolution, and it was difficult to arrive at a consensus of views as to how the US should react to this strange phenomenon. A long history of good relations with Russia, an early satisfaction at the overthrow of the Czarist autocracy, revulsion at Bolshevik terror, the problems of dealing with so uncommon a revolutionary regime - all were factors in shaping the American attitudes. Concerning the problems in establishing relations, the policies of the Soviet government made a reasonable approach difficult. The Soviet refusal to recognize the validity of the former government's debts, the practice of state trading, and especially the harboring of the Comintern, with its advocacy of violent action against all bourgeois regimes, did nothing to create a favorable climate. In the circumstances, a desire to keep uninvolved was probably the dominant sentiment amid all the confusing counsel. This comported with the isolationist feeling in the country. The Soviet Union was far away, the future of its Bolshevik regime was uncertain, and the other great powers had a more immediate responsibility for seeing if this disturbing member could be restored to the family of nations.

3. A few remarks about the decade of the 1940's. In both governmental and unofficial circles, we were slow to realize the incompatibility of Soviet and American notions of what a satisfactory world order should be. We were too ready to assume that communist definitions of such terms as "peace," "democracy," and "free elections" were similar to our own. While in hindsight we can see that we were naive (and here a lack of attention to communist ideology and Soviet practice contributed to our unsophistication), it was probably necessary for the nation to go through the periods of good faith and then disillusionment. Without them there might well have been a long period of deep public division over whether a reasonably amicable relationship between the two countries

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could have been established. However, by trying to work with the Soviets in the postwar occupation of enemy countries, by concessions to Moscow's security demands, by offers of Marshall Plan participation, and by other attempts at cooperation, we at least removed a great question mark and laid the foundation for a basic foreign policy which has overwhelming public support.

4. The Next Decade. Although the US and the USSR will remain the dominant world powers throughout the next ten years, it is quite possible that the confrontation may not be as stark as it has been during the past decade. Three probable developments in international affairs support this hypothesis. One is the emergence of new centers of power. Over the past few years several countries have gained in strength relative to the two super powers. In Asia, Communist China, Japan, and India are comparatively stronger, and they will probably dispose more weight in the future configurations of world power. The recovery of Western Europe from its immediate postwar prostration has been proceeding steadily, and if integration continues this regime will be a more considerable factor in the power equation. In Latin America, Brazil might develop into a secondary power of greater than regional importance. As a second consideration, both the US and the USSR will probably be required to devote more attention and resources to the areas where they have enjoyed an uncontested dominance. For the US, Latin American problems almost certainly will take on a new importance and urgency. The USSR will have to give increased attention to the Communist Bloc, particularly its relations with Peking. As a third development, the Soviet Union will find that as it increases its involvement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America the relatively simple postures it has taken in foreign affairs will no longer suffice. Moscow will have to recognize the complexities of international relations - the tensions and rivalries of the Arab world, the explosive problems of Black Africa, the demands of increasing claimants for aid of all kinds, the handicaps of supporting subversive movements while trying to maintain amicable state-to-state relations. In short, the Kremlin will probably experience some of the frustrations and hard choices that other great powers have learned to expect in their dealings with several scores of countries, many politically immature and intensely nationalistic. There are signs that the complexities inherent in conducting relations with a great variety of states, all with their special problems and interests, are already complicating the Moscow-Peking axis. The commitments and responsibilities which the USSR has assumed, and its hopes

for further advances, do not allow it to indulge in some of the free-wheeling that seems to characterize Communist Chinese policy. It is probable that the coming decade will bring further problems in the coordination of communist dealings with the rest of the world.

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